“THE CONTRAT IN VIGUEUR,” URL: nzhistory.govt.nz/anzus-comes-into-force, (Ministry of Culture and Heritage), updated on 26.04.2017 Given the obvious criticism of the ADF operations of most of the platforms or weapons mentioned above, it is clear that any inability to obtain repair or replacement services for them could have serious operational consequences. Thus, it can be said that Australia is dependent on the United States in these regions. The existence of this type of dependency is recognized in the recent White Paper on Defence (see box below). The risk, of course, is that, for whatever reason and despite the development of agreements explaining how the ADF should obtain logistical support from the United States, the necessary parties or services are not available or inaccessible when necessary. The political and operational impact of this uncertainty will be discussed below. While there were signs of a thaw in the nuclear dispute between the United States and NZ, U.S. pressure soared in 2006, when U.S. trade agents linked the lifting of the ban on U.S. nuclear ships from New Zealand ports to a possible free trade agreement between the two countries.
 Recent proposals for a free trade agreement between Australia and the United States, while still timid, have obvious negative and positive effects. In particular, an agreement effectively excluding all of Australia`s other major trading partners from what would be considered a “trade bloc” between Australia and the United States (or at least deliberately misrepreserated) could send completely inappropriate signals to the region. In any event, it is interesting to note that the draft free trade agreement could exclude the difficult primary products sector. In accordance with the Article 2 agreements of the treaty, Australia is granted preference status for the purchase of US military equipment, which means that Australia has continuous access instead of having to negotiate authorization on a case-by-case basis. The agreements with the United States “also provide for the provision of ammunition and equipment in the event of an emergency, which will mitigate the need for large-scale storage by the ADF.” (31) Some have argued that this relationship between procurement and defence logistics is a double-edged sword, with “access” being an understatement for dependency. But no nation, with the possible exception of the United States itself, and especially a nation the size and population of Australia, can expect to be truly independent, especially if “the reality of modern warfare requires that allied technology fit well.” (32) Even in their quest for autonomy, Australian governments have accepted that Australia should depend on its alliance with the United States to provide the technical means to defend itself. The 2000 White Paper on Defence confirms the relevance of this dependence and notes that “the type of ADF we need is not possible without technological access from the American alliance.” (33) The Security Treaty of Australia, New Zealand, the United States (ZUS or ZUS Treaty) is the non-binding collective security agreement between Australia and New Zealand of 1951 and, separately, Australia and the United States to cooperate on military matters in the Pacific Ocean, although the treaty is now treated as a conflict. It foresees that an armed attack on one of the three parties would be dangerous to the others and that each of them should act to deal with the common threat. It has set up a committee of foreign ministers that can meet in consultation. In response to this strategic dilemma, Australia has established a model of relationships with a great and powerful friend.
It struggled to resist this dependence when it had the opportunity in the early 1950s to negotiate a treaty that would encourage the United States to supplement or replace Britain as allies, especially since the United States had been so capable and useful as an ally over Britain during World War II, when Australia was directly threatened.